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Since 1991, three regional security complexes have emerged on the Eurasian geopolitical 
extension if the former Soviet Union in Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The pattern 
of enmity/amity, well as the nature of a regional security complex (RSC), created the structural 
context of each of the above-mentioned complex. In addition to the crucial factor of “foreign 
penetration,” the process of state building including the transition from Communism to democratic 
rule and free-market economy played a central role in the formation of the new Eurasian regional 
security complexes. 
This essay uses the RSC analytical framework to look closely to the interactions between 
the three South Caucasian republics. It sustains that the dominant patterns in South Caucasus are 
those of rivalry and enmity. Foreign penetration, on the other hand, is high. Relations of balance of 
power, hence, would characterize the South Caucasian Regional Security Complex.   
How in conditions of a balance-of-power situation is possible development? What are the 
dilemmas to confront? What role does democracy plays in maximizing development in a balance-
of-power situation? These are the questions among others that this essay, focused on Armenia in 
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Introduction 
 
The decade following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, 
defined the new geopolitical dynamics in the Eurasian heartland. This dynamics consisted 
of the simultaneous and interactive processes of transition to market economy and the 
struggle to reach to a new balance of power in the geographical area where the 
fragmentation of the once imperial structure led to the emergence of fifteen independent 
states. A widely common path consisting of “shock therapy” privatization and 
liberalization characterized the process of economic transition of all of the former Soviet 
republics; the domestic and foreign aspects of the struggle for power to consolidate the 
national borders, and within them a particular structure of hierarchy and domination, 
however, have been different across emerging three regional division lines in Europe, 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The former Soviet republics, thus, were grouped 
regionally; only the Russian Federation remained an intervening actor in the three regions. 
This regional variation in the political struggle ended up determining the contours of the 
new structure of the balance of power in the formerly Soviet space of Eurasia; which, in 
turn, strongly conditioned the development of each of the fifteen independent states, albeit 
in different forms and grade for each state. 
The legacy of the Cold War explains this difference between a regionally nuanced 
struggle for power and a broadly uniform process of economic transition. The post-World 
War II bipolar structure institutionalized unwritten rules of engagement that made the ‘long 
peace’ (Gaddis 1989) between the rival superpowers possible. Among these rules was 
avoiding direct confrontation, which could escalate to a nuclear war with the only horizon 
of the Mutually Assured Destruction. Nuclear dissuasion, hence, implied the mutual 
respect for zones of influence, especially the ones that were considered sensitive from a 
national security perspective. Thus, despite its hawkish rhetoric, even the ‘roll-back’ 
strategy of the Reagan administration targeted the overextension of the empire, as it was 
perceived in Afghanistan and elsewhere, not the proper territory of Soviet Union. Yet, once 
the imperial structure collapsed mostly under the pressure of its internal contradictions, the 
vacuum of power made inevitable the inclusion of the former Soviet space in the global 
political competition. On the other hand, while at least during the post-Cold War decade of 
1991-2001 relations with the Russian Federation remained a priority for Washington, and 
other international and regional players, the emergence of new state actors made policy 
centralization towards Moscow unnecessary, and the diversification of the agenda 
inevitable. Accordingly, in addition to the internal processes of political struggle in the 
former Soviet republics following the collapse, international systemic conditions shaped 
the multilateral structure of the new balance of power in the Eurasian heartland. 
But the Cold War also confronted two opposed ideologies implying two different 
worldviews and models of society and economic development. The October Revolution in 
1917 was one of the greatest utopias, a historical experience that though, according to the 
British historian Eric Hobsbawm, will not be repeated, represented, at least in the 
beginning, “hope” for humanity (2005). The Soviet model of development, indeed, 
remained, at least until the 1980s, an alternative to capitalism, and as such inspired many 
of Third World countries. Nevertheless, it is now all too clear that this model ended up in a 
failure as it proved to be unable neither to compete with the innovative spirit of global 
capitalism, nor to reform the system to protect society against the vices of centrally planed 
economies. Whether Perestroika would have worked in another historical context, and 
hence provide a reformist model of a ‘socialist market,’ is a debatable issue. Yet, once the 
system as a whole collapsed, the inevitable conclusion was the ideological victory of the 
Western camp and the triumph of the liberal democracy and free market model of 
development. Nevertheless, the important issue here is not whether this model proved to be 
more successful, at least competitively. It did. The issue is whether the “shock therapy” 
mode of implementation of economic reform was the only alternative. The Eastern 
European experience, mostly in Poland, showed that indeed there was an alternative that 
could have avoided painful financial collapses, sharp social polarization and the 
“piratization” the economy (Goldman 2003), of which suffered the former Soviet republics 
in the 1990s. 
The emphasis on differentiating between the uniformity of the economic transition 
and the regionally nuanced political process has important analytical implications. First, it 
avoids the predominant ideological reductionism that links free market with democracy 
and, hence, emphasizes the complexity of the transitional phenomenon. Second, it shows 
better the domestic/international interplay whereas systemic pressures and internal 
struggles for domination condition the economic development. Third, by highlighting the 
structural constraints of the transitional process, it allows linking political decisions to 
economic considerations, and, thus, evaluate their overall impact on society. A regional 
approach to the transitional process and the resulting context, therefore, offers a wider 
perspective to study the prospect of development in the Eurasian heartland of the former 
Soviet space. 
International Relations (IR) Theory offers a wide range of conceptual tools to study 
processes of regionalization. Most of these tools refer to the process of regional 
integration, and, hence, put the emphasis on opening borders and liberalizing the flow of 
goods and, to a lesser extend, persons. Nevertheless, since the end of Cold War, regional 
perspectives of IR Theory started to address other issues such as political relations, social 
movements and security. These approaches often refer to the process of regionalization of 
international politics in terms of “regional orders” (Lake and Morgan 1997; Soligen 1998), 
“regional complexes” (Buzan 1999; Buzan and Weaver 2003), or “security communities” 
(Adler and Barnett 1998). Accordingly, and no matter whether they part from a structural, 
institutional or constructivist perspective, the regional approaches in IR Theory sustain that 
the regional level of interaction among political units explain far better the outcome of the 
process than either traditional theories such as Realism, Liberalism or Marxism, or 
conjectural and case by case analysis. The former is too broad to capture the complexity of 
the political phenomenon, whereas the latter fails to see how crucial have become 
transborder linkages between units for the understanding of the evolution of each one of 
them. 
This essay uses the regional security complex (RSC) analytical framework to 
address the challenges that Armenia faces in the South Caucasus. It sustains that due to the 
dominant pattern of relations of enmity with Azerbaijan and rivalry with Georgia, balance 
of power considerations gain priority. Foreign penetration in the region, on the other hand, 
is high and structured in turn of the U.S.-Russian relations, the European Union (EU) 
policy, and, to a lesser degree, Turkish and Iranian interests and power projections. The 
process of state formation in the 1990s, finally, conditions strongly the domestic political 
and economic development. How do these regional, global and domestic interplays react 
with each other? What possible impact do they have on the present and the future of 
Armenia? How in these conditions can Armenia develop? These are the questions that the 
conclusion of the essay tries to answer.  
In what follows I first describe the RSC analytical framework. Next I apply it for 
the South Caucasus to define the global, regional and domestic levels of interaction. The 
third section analyzes closely the security dynamics on these levels. The conclusion 
combines the elements of the framework to determine their impact on Armenia along the 
guidelines of the questions formulated above. The aim of the paper is not to provide 
precise policy prescriptions, rather to discuss critically some components of Armenian 




I. The RSC Framework of Analysis: A Conceptual Approach 
The regional perspective of IR Theory sustains the existence of regional 
subsystems relatively autonomous from the global system. A regional subsystem lies 
between the general tendencies of the global system and the unit-level inter-state 
interactions. The distinctive feature of a subsystem is the geographical proximity of the 
component states, a situation, which provides a unique dynamics to their interactions based 
upon power relations and amity/enmity patterns. A regional subsystem, thus is defined in 
terms of a “security complex” as “an empirical phenomenon with historical and 
geographical roots. In theoretical terms, they can be derived from both the state and the 
system levels. Looked at from the bottom up, security complexes result from interaction 
between individual states. They represent the way in which the sphere of concern that any 
state has about its environment, interacts with the linkages between the intensity of 
military and political threats, and the shortness of the range over which they are perceived. 
Because threats operate more potently over short distances, security interactions with 
neighbors will tend to have first priority. Seen from the top down, security complexes are 
generated by interaction of anarchy and geography. The political structure anarchy 
confronts all states with the security dilemma, but the otherwise seamless web of security 
interdependence is powerfully mediated by the effect of geography. Unless capabilities for 
transportation are very unevenly distributed, as they sometimes are, all states will thus tend 
to be thrust into closer contact with their neighbors rather then those further afield.” 
(Buzan 1999, 191) 
Based upon this initial definition of regional complexes, Buzan and Waever (2003) 
deepen the analysis of the amity/enmity following the logic of the securitization 
framework.1 They, thus, define a Regional Security Complex (RSC)  “by durable patterns 
of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of 
security interdependence.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 45) Within this approach, and along 
with power relations, durable conflicts and long-term historical rivalries, the security 
                                                 
1 “Securitization” is a conceptual approach to security studies initially proposed by the Copenhagen School 
of IR and, later, fully developed as an analytical framework by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998). Very 
broadly, it sustains that security dynamics can best be understood in a framework combining five levels, 
defined as “ontological referents for where things happen rather than sources of explanation in themselves” 
(1998, 5), the international systems, the international subsystems, the units, the subunits, and the individuals; 
five sectors “identifying the specific type of interaction” (1998, 7) –military political, economic, societal and 
environmental; and regions. “Securitization” on the other hand refers to an extreme version of politicization 
in terms of which “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object,” 
whereas “the special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.” 
(1998, 21)  
dynamics in a RSC also depends on the way actors, mostly but not exclusively states, 
construct their identity. 
The RSC framework specifies four interrelated levels of analysis: (a) the domestic 
order in terms of stability and vulnerabilities that define its security fears; (b) state-to-state 
relations; (c) the region’s interaction with neighboring regions, a level that is relatively 
limited except when major changes of security interdependence are underway; and (d) the 
role of global powers in the region. These levels in turn define the essential structure of an 
RSC that embodies four variables: (a) boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its 
neighbors; (b) anarchic structure, meaning that the RSC should be composed of two or 
more autonomous units; (c) polarity, or the distribution of power among the units; and (d) 
social construction, or the definition of patterns of amity and enmity among units. Finally, 
there are three possible evolutions open to any RSC: (a) maintenance of the status quo; (b) 
internal transformations in either the distribution of power among interacting units or the 
patterns of amity/enmity; and (c) external transformations, which occur when the 
boundaries of an RSC changes by contraction or expansion. 
The RSC Theory defines also types of security complexes based upon variations in 
polarity and in patterns of amity/enmity leading to either standard or centered ones.2 The 
former “is broadly Westphalian in form with two or more powers and a predominantly 
military-security agenda.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 55) Whereas centered RSCs come in 
three, and may be four, main forms. “The first two forms are the special cases in which an 
RSC is unipolar, but the power concerned is either a great power (e.g., Russia in the CIS) 
or a superpower (e.g., the United States in North America), rather than just a regional 
power.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 55) The third type of centered RSCs involves “a region 
integrated by institutions rather than by a single power” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 56), as 
is the EU. The distinctive feature of these centered RSCs is its high level of 
institutionalization and the development of a security community, whereas though 
competition persists among units it avoids balance of power behaviors. In its highest level, 
which in today’s real world empirically does not make much sense, a security community 
defines a common identity. Buzan and Waever, furthermore, study cases that do not fit 
                                                 
2 It is worth reminding that the RSC Theory as developed by Buzan and Waever borrows conceptual 
elements from both Kenneth Wlatz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) and Alexander Wendt’s Social 
Theory of International Politics (1999). The variations in polarity, from unipolar to multipolar, of an RSC are 
the structural element of the Theory borrowed from Waltz, whereas the variations in amity and enmity 
ranging from conflict formation to security regimes and security communities reflect the three ideal types of 
interaction defined in Wendt’s book: the Hobbessian world of enmity, the Lockean world of rivalry and the 
Kantian world of amity. The authors, however, take their distance from these ideal types stressing that 
within these types, arising from a number of global powers scattered through the system. 
“The more such powers there are in the system, the less room will be for standard RSCs; 
the fewer, the more room. Having great powers scattered through the international system 
creates two possibilities other than centered complexes: great power regional security 
complexes, and supercomplexes.”3 (Buzan and Waever 2003, 59) The former is a bi or 
multipolar complex with great powers as regional poles, whereas the latter expresses a 
strong interregional level of security dynamics arising from great power spillover into 
adjacent regions. 
 
II. The South Caucasian RSC 
Based upon their detailed conceptualization of the RSC Theory, Buzan and Waever 
consider the “post-Soviet space” as one of the three parts of the supercomplex the 
“Europes” –the other two, according to the authors, being the EU, and the Balkans and 
Turkey. Within this approach, whereas the whole post-Soviet space is a constellation, with 
Russia as the great power and the other fourteen former Soviet republics grouped in four 
different subregions: the three Baltic states –Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia; the three 
western group of states –Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; the three South Caucasian 
republics –Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and the five Central Asian states –
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. “For most of the states, 
security concerns relate mainly to other states in the subcomplex plus Russia. What define 
the wider RSC, grouping them all together, are the unifying factors, first, of Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, second, that a coalition attempting to rein 
in Russia necessarily cuts across the regions.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 397) Historically, 
the debate in turn of the Russian identity construction evolved in turn if its pro-European 
or pro-Eurasian orientation; nevertheless, “the global arena is today much more important 
than Europe for Russia’s attempts both to secure a larger role outside its region and to 
legitimize its regional empire.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 398) Thus, in addition to the 
EU, China and Japan and their respective RSCs in Asia are increasingly active in the 
evolution of the security dynamics in the post-Soviet space. 
Interestingly, the authors downplay the role of the United States in this dynamics. 
“In contrast to most other regions of the world, the one superpower, the USA, plays less f a 
role in this region, although a question mark has emerged in Central Asia and the 
                                                                                                                                                    
“conflict formation is rather wider than Wendt’s Hobbessian model, and security regime is probably a rather 
narrower idea than his Lockean model.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 54)   
3 Italics in original text. 
Caucasus, mostly due to oil interests and, after September 2001, the war on terrorism.” 
(Buzan and Waever 2003, 398) Even before September 2001, the US impact in the 
formation of the post-Soviet space has been notable, let alone in terms of the debates that 
generated the perspectives of the expansion of NATO. The US impact is much more 
visible, of course, after September 2001 with the installation of military bases in Central 
Asia, the “Train and Equip” program in Georgia, the participation of some former Soviet 
republics to the Coalition Forces in Iraq and the support to ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia 
and Ukraine. Hence, when considering the security dynamics in the post-Soviet space the 
role of the United States as the global superpower in the post-Cold War gains much more 
importance than what do Buzan and Waever assign to. 
When considering the US factor in the security dynamics of the post-Soviet space, 
certain modifications to the analysis of each of the subregions that the authors offer 
become inevitable. Including the analysis of the Caucasus that the authors consider as one 
subcomplex of two parts –the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus. Thus, when 
applying the four levels of analysis of a RSC, as well as the four factors of the basic 
structure of the same, only the South Caucasus acquires analytical legitimacy to be defined 
as a RSC. Let alone considering that only in the South Caucasus are there state actors that 
give a true meaning of “anarchy” in its conceptual understanding. There, thus, are no real 
“state-to-state” relations in North Caucasus, which lies within the territorial limits of the 
Russian Federation notwithstanding the separatist movements and the confuse situation of 
Chechnya. Nor is there, for the same reason, foreign penetration or global influence of 
other great powers or the superpower in North Caucasus. Only the transnational element of 
Islamism in its Jihadist variant4 is the ideological mobilizing factor visible mostly through 
the militant websites on the Net.  
This is not the case for the South Caucasus. The four levels of analysis of the RSC 
framework there are very clear and offer no ambiguity when considering the security 
dynamics from this conceptual perspective. Thus, the domestic order emerged from the 
process of state building after independence; this process, on the other hand, still 
determines much of the stability and vulnerabilities of the domestic order. The state-to-
state relations level, in turn, is mostly a situation of “conflict formation” as all three 
republics have territorial claims and/or ethnic problems as yet another legacy of Soviet 
times. Though the Caspian and Black Sea regions interact with the Caucasus either through 
                                                 
4 The “Jihadist variant” of militant Islam is a term used to describe the Sunni fundamentalist sector that 
following the Al-Qaeda model of political struggle relies mostly on terrorism to pursue its major aim, which 
consists in the reunification of the Islamic nation –the “Umma Islamiya”- and the rebirth of the Caliphate. 
energy corridors or in attempts of cooperation forums, the level of interaction is not 
significant; it does not have an impact on the state-to-state relations so to make these 
relations within the complex more coherent and the region as a whole more compact. 
Russian-US relationship within the context of the War on Terrorism, finally, and, to a 
minor extent, EU’s Neighborhood Policy determines the grade of foreign penetration in the 
South Caucasus. 
These levels of analysis, in turn, define the essential structure of the South 
Caucasus in terms of: boundaries –the international frontiers of the three South Caucasian 
states; anarchic structure –three independent states, three self-declared independent states 
(Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia and South Osetia), and three, probably four, autonomous 
units (Ajaria, Marneouli, Javakhk and the Talish factor); polarity –the status of the balance 
of power measured in terms of the military strength of each of the states; and social 
construction –patterns of amity and enmity among the states, the self-declared independent 
states and the more or less autonomous units. These analytical elements, finally, allow 
foreseeing the possible evolutions of the South Caucasus RSC in terms of status quo, 
internal transformation, or external transformation.  
The next section takes a closer look to three levels of analysis to describe the 
security dynamics in the South Caucasus RSC.  
 
III. The Security Dynamics in South Caucasus 
To look closer to the security dynamics in the South Caucasian complex, we need 
to emphasize three of the four analytical levels of the RSC framework: the global level and 
foreign penetration, state-to-state relations and the regional balance of power, and the 
domestic order, or the consequences of the ongoing process of state building. As 
mentioned above, the third level, interaction with other regions, does not seem too 
meaningful for the South Caucasus. Not at least in terms of its impact on the security 
dynamics of the region as a whole. 
The global level of analysis of the South Caucasus RSC is defined first and 
foremost by the pattern of Russian-US competition/cooperation relationship: while both 
have strong interests in avoiding the proliferation of strategic weapons and cooperating in 
the War on Terror, they also cannot avoid competing for influence in the post-Soviet space. 
Initially, the new Russian foreign policy wanted to reshape the “Near Abroad” (Aron 
1998), with the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Treaty 
on Collective Security (known as the Tashkent Treaty, signed in 1992). Yet the initiative 
faced the challenge of the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the emergence of the 
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM) initiative supported by 
the US State Department. Despite the success of several enterprises such as the common 
system of air defense, Russia was not able to consolidate the CIS; instead, it created the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in October 2002 with those CIS states 
that have chosen to continue the military cooperation with Russia after 1999. The CSTO 
since then became much more institutionalized and internationally recognized then the 
former Tashkent Treaty. Moreover, the new organization began cooperation with NATO 
especially in Afghanistan. 
Analyst Marcin Kaczmarki considers this move a proof of a “much more realistic” 
Russian foreign policy. “Russia wants to build a strong organization, not endangered by 
desertions of states wanting to join NATO. However, its potential allies still remain weak 
states, which forces Russia to finance the modernization of their military forces.” 
(Kaczmarki 2005) This leaves room for the US to move forward with the expansion of its 
influence either through NATO expansion, or the “strategy for bases” and military ad-hoc 
cooperation. Formally conceived within the broader national security strategy in the War 
on Terrorism, the US bases in the former Soviet bloc might, as Ted Galen Carpenter from 
the Cato Institute believes, indicate also a strategy to encircle Russia, which “must still 
prove itself as a democracy and a friend of the West.” (Tully 2005) 
This US-Russian pattern of cooperative/competitive relationship creates a very 
precarious stability in the South Caucasus, because neither the strategic alliances are 
durable, nor do they create dividing lines along which a balance of power situation could 
be consolidated. While all three countries, and to some extent the autonomous units, do 
have some space for strategic maneuverings, it is the global US-Russian interplay that 
strongly condition the decision-making process for each actor in the complex.  
The European presence and influence in South Caucasus is somehow different from 
the US global politics. Shaped through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
Europe’s ‘expansion’ to the post-Soviet space is not exempt from security concerns as the 
article I-57 on the ‘Union and its neighbors’ of the December 2003 European Security 
Strategy declares. It is also continues a series of initiatives addressing Europe’s relations 
with its neighbors since 1989. “The ENP departs from these precedents in that it does not 
set up an overarching framework or conference that entails regular meetings of all the 
neighbors at any level. The EU has jettisoned a grand, multilateral approach in favor of 
bilateralism: the ENP concentrates on developing bilateral relations between the EU and 
individual countries, in an attempt to influence their internal and external policies.” (Smith 
2005, 761) In its origins, the ENP was born only early 2002 and aimed at the European 
countries of the post-Soviet space; only in July 2004, and after lobbying by the Caucasian 
countries and the successful “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the Council of Europe 
extended the initiative further to Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Europe’s strategy of 
security and stabilization excludes any direct involvement in the process of conflict 
resolution and circumscribes Brussels’s role in the active support given to the Organization 
of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) initiatives. Nevertheless, it still is 
perceived as a threat at least in some circles in Russia. Not surprisingly Russia has 
declined to participate in any of the programs the ENP offers preferring a more equalitarian 
basis of relationship and engagement. Even if the European security strategy is different 
from the US in its form and content, Moscow sees EU’s westward expansion as part of the 
wider “West” (along with the US and NATO) trying to undermine its power and presence 
in areas Moscow considers vital for its national security (Pikayev 2005). There is no proof 
of a European direct engagement in the so-called “color revolution” in Georgia or Ukraine, 
yet after the successful access to power of the new leadership both countries did receive 
more attention, and both ambition joining the EU in the future. Given the serious troubles 
the European process suffered after the French and Dutch ‘No’ to the Constitution (May-
June 2005) and the social discontent the Turkish future membership has created, there is no 
prospect for further European expansion no matter how strong the desire of inclusion is in 
Georgia, Ukraine or any other former Soviet republic.          
Despite initial efforts by Turkey and Iran right after the fall of the Soviet Union to 
become leading power players in the Caucasus, none of these two countries has been able 
to consolidate its long-term presence and influence. Notwithstanding the ethnic factor in 
Turkish-Azeri relations and signals of the institutionalization of Turkish-Georgian military 
cooperation, the negotiations of Ankara with Brussels in the next decade or more would 
gain much more importance for Turkey then any power projection initiative eastward. Iran, 
on the other hand, faces a serious national security challenge with the US military presence 
in Iraq, and will care much more for the consolidation of its regional presence in the 
Middle East through the strengthening of the Shiite axis then about the South Caucasus. 
None of these countries will cease to mark their presence in the region, yet not in terms of 
power projection or any meaningful interventionism. If initially it was Moscow that did not 
want any foreign interference in its “Near Abroad” while Washington encouraged Turkish 
partial engagement and vetoed any Iranian presence, the strategic context of the War on 
Terror seems to align both the US and Russia in avoiding foreign interferences. With the 
US in Iraq and Russia busy in Chechnya, both countries have their own wars in two 
neighboring regions, and, hence, an interest in creating in the intermediate zone of the 
South Caucasus a relatively stable region. 
The next level of the security dynamics is the pattern of state-to-state relationship 
in the South Caucasus RSC. On this level, the South Caucasus is clearly a “conflict in 
formation” complex. As Fiona Hill’s testimony to the House Armed Services Committee 
resumes, “it is unlikely that the so-called frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus –in 
Nagorno-Karabagh, Abkhazia, and South Osetia- will be resolved in this decade.” (2005, 
11) Obviously the pattern of relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is enmity, 
which is expressed in official discourses and public opinion. Relations between Armenia 
and Georgia, on the other hand, are characterized with rivalry, mostly because of the 
Javakheti region. Nationalist discourse and practice in the domestic order on the one hand, 
and the divergent orientations of the foreign policy of both countries make an amity 
relationship impossible in present circumstances. Georgian-Azerbaijani relations, finally, 
are also closer to the rivalry pattern rather than the amity despite the common interest for 
the Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan pipeline and attempts of cooperation within the GUUAM 
framework. The main reason is the desire for larger autonomy of Azerbaijani ethnic 
minority in Georgia and Tbilissi’s opposition to it. More than the global level, the state-to-
state relations level conditions strongly the South Caucasian countries. Because of the 
“conflict in formation” characteristic of the complex, no external incentive has so far been 
strong enough to change the patterns of relationship between the countries and start a 
process of regional integration. The relationship between the regional and global level, 
therefore, is not static; while the global factor has certainly played a key role in stopping 
the bloodshed by mid-1990s, and still is crucial to avoid the outbreak of fighting, local 
actors still can not only successfully block any progress to a final agreement but also create 
new situations and change the nature of foreign intermediation, or start full-scale military 
operations again. This regional situation, finally, is functional to local elites in all three 
countries, who seldom use the nationalist rhetoric and the foreign security threat factor to 
perpetuate in power. 
Last, the domestic order level is shaped through two interconnected and ongoing 
processes: transition to market economy and state building. While, as in all other former 
Soviet countries, transition to market economy in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia shared 
the same characteristic of shock therapy liberalization and privatization, as well as the 
same outcome –concentration of the wealth in the hands of minority, sharp social 
polarization and widespread corruption-, the process of state building in each case 
depended heavily on the outcome of war. Hence, from this perspective, the question to ask 
is what kind of state did warfare produced in the South Caucasus? 
Initially the military struggle led to three critical changes –the shift from private to 
public control over the means of violence; dramatic increases in the size of the armies; and 
more national homogeneity within the territorial borders of the state-, yet the outcome of 
the process in terms of internal order, as well as state-society dynamics, has been different 
for each of the three countries. One reason is that the national borders of the formerly 
Soviet republics were established back in 1924 not by warfare and territorial consolidation, 
as was the case in the European process of state-making in the 17th century, but rather 
through the strategic calculations of Stalin aiming at the reconciliation of Lenin’s principle 
of people’s right for self-determination with the unchallenged central authority of the 
Communist Party. Thus, while the war for Nagorno-Karabagh is of inter-state nature with 
the involvement of Armenia, the conflicts of Osetia and Abkhazia are seldom qualified as 
“secessionism;” and though in neither case the authority in Tbilissi confronted formally 
recognized states, Abkhaz and Oset ethnic groups clearly differentiated themselves from 
the dominant Georgians. 
From the perspective of the collapse of the Soviet Union, armed conflict in the 
Caucasus has generally been characterized as “civil war,” which “follows when the state’s 
capacity to rule is undermined by ethnic rivalry, by nationalist claims, or by globalization.” 
(Holloway and Stedman 2002, 168) Nationalism caused the Soviet breakup, “but it was a 
more general Soviet system that opened the way to nationalist mobilization.” (Holloway 
and Stedman 2002, 176) All the three wars in Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia and South 
Osetia were fought for the desire of independent statehood, as the collapse of the Soviet 
system did not involve any redrawing of the internal borders of the former multinational 
state. The conflicts in the Caucasus highlighted the persistent dilemma of self-
determination and territorial integrity. In fact, final solutions to the conflicts are still 
prisoners of this dilemma in spite of creative efforts to overcome it. 
Of the three South Caucasian countries, only Armenia avoided civil war and, 
hence, managed to establish a relatively stable domestic order despite the political crisis of 
1996 and 1999. This, according to an ongoing research, is not explained so much by the 
ethnic homogeneity of Armenia, a feature that neither prevented political and social 
fragmentation, nor widespread assassinations often with the complicity of the elite in 
power; “the most unifying aspect of the early Armenian independence period is that its 
militias were implicated in fighting a foreign war in Azerbaijan.” (Fearon and Laitin 2005) 
This foreign threat factor prevented the bloody military coups that both Georgia and 
Azerbaijan suffered to happen in Armenia. Yet, obviously, neither was it enough to avoid 
inter-gang assassinations and contract murders, nor can it assure perpetual stability. 
In Georgia’s case, the secessionist nature of the conflicts that broke out in 
Abkhazia and South Osetia after independence did not create the perception of an outside 
threat powerful enough to unify Georgian armed units. While Georgian nationalists, 
following the lead of the former dissident and first president Zviad Gamsakhourtia, argued 
for independence from Russian domination, the real war that they fought was against 
Abkhazians and South Osetians, not Russians. For Abkhazians and South Osetians, quite 
the opposite, the war was for self-determination, it was a national liberation struggle from 
the Georgians; hence the strength of their internal unity. Despite the “Rose Revolution,” 
Georgia’s agenda still has the nationalist perspective of denying autonomy to non-
Georgian ethnic communities in the country, it, thus, simply ignores any perspective of a 
federated state. No wonder, then, that the domestic order in Georgia will continue to be 
instable. 
Azerbaijan, finally, could also argue about the external threat, Armenia, trying to 
make out of it a factor of domestic stability, and, indeed, this behavior is quite observable 
in Baku’s discourse and practice. Nonetheless, political crisis in Azerbaijan proved to be 
much more bloody than in its enemy country. A hypothesis to explain why the external 
threat did not provide internal cohesion in Azerbaijan could well be the oil factor. In fact, 
while war in Nagorno Karabagh was still going on, the Caspian oil factor suddenly 
emerged in international politics, and amidst a global interest to invest billions of dollars to 
exploit the oil fields, local fractions faced the challenge of either winning the war in 
Karabagh or consolidating power in Baku and dominate oil transactions. After the 
militarily forced resignation of Abulfez Elchibey and the return of Heidar Aliyev it was 
this latter’s choice to give priority to the consolidation of its power in the state rather than 
continue the war. With the son replacing the father in power following a model common to 
almost all Middle Eastern oil autocracies or authoritarian regimes, the threat to the stability 
of the domestic order in Azerbaijan emerges mostly from the domination of a clan on the 
major income resource of the country, and not from ethnic fragmentation or separatism.  
So, even though the domestic order in all three republics is threatened with the 
fragmentation of society and, hence, a state-society tensed relationship, the characteristics 
of this fragmentation are different. The fragmentation is social in Armenia, ethnic in 





Conclusion: Armenia in the Regional Context 
Of all the three states, Armenia is the one that lacks both natural resources and 
seashore. It is, thus, by far the most dependent from external factors. Yet, the military 
victory on the battlefield gave Armenia a considerable advantage over its two neighbors in 
terms of the construction of a relatively stable domestic order. Little, if anything, can 
Armenia do on both global and regional level, except to be flexible enough to adapt to 
changes and face the challenge of any modification of external factors. Thus, the prospect 
of the outbreak of war with Azerbaijan at any time reinforces the strategic alliance with 
Russia. In turn, Armenia has made valuable concessions to Russian interests including in 
strategically sensitive fields such as energy. It cannot even avoid Russian pressures in its 
foreign bilateral relations if Moscow perceives any drive to ease the Armenian 
dependency. 
Armenia’s foreign policy termed “Complementarity” aims at opening a way to 
precisely ease the burden of dependency on Russia. It locates Armenia on the East-West 
axis, in a constant exercise of balancing one outside factor with another. On the US-
Russian relationship level, this policy pays in the sense that despite its military alliance 
with Russia, The United States does not have a hostile attitude towards Armenia. This, in 
turn, helps keeping Armenia on the list of the receptors of US foreign aid. It also is useful 
in Armenia’s relations with international financial institutions. This, of course, is not the 
sole virtue of “Complementarity,” which probably would make little if any sense without 
the active political engagement of the Armenian community in the United States. 
Moreover, it is the successful “domestic political penetration” of Armenian advocacy 
groups in Washington DC (Walt 2005, 213-216) that created, and still supports, the current 
US interest for Armenia. “Complementarity” could also be interpreted as Armenia’s 
accommodation to the dual Russian-US pressure on the global level; and while the costs of 
“Complementarity” are quite obvious, its net benefits in terms of development are at least 
debatable. Moreover, “Complementarity” might even become a straightjacket in that it 
narrows the worldview of Armenia’s foreign policy on the East-West axis, and, thus, turns 
a blind eye on the developmental opportunities that a global vision might allow to 
discover.  
The EU also exercises outside pressure on Armenia, and this pressure perhaps is 
the most effective in that it provides important domestic changes in both governing 
structures and society. It is also a pressure that Armenia’s political elite welcomes, and, as 
the process of the Constitutional reform showed in 2005, it uses to overcome political and 
societal obstacles to change. Whether the Armenian political elite fantasizes or not joining 
the EU is secondary compared to the progress that the European pressure helped 
registering in opening new venues for the deepening of democracy or the consolidation of 
human rights. We can only speculate, for instance, whether the National Assembly would 
abolish death penalty had not been the European pressure, yet the fact remains that those 
deputies who were pushing for the abolition frequently used the argument to convince their 
colleagues to vote for the project. The same is true for the Constitutional reforms hailed as 
the right step forward in Brussels. Now, the European idea and model has entered in phase 
of crisis after the French and Dutch ‘No’ to the Constitution, and since then political forces 
and social movements have initiated a wide debate about alternative views of the process 
of integration aiming at a more participative model of democracy and decision making and, 
above all, a sustainable economic development and better redistribution of wealth. These 
alternative views of the European model so far have not made their way into Armenia. 
The domestic order, finally, is the level in the RSC analytical framework where post 
changes are possible, and probably the only way to ease the burden of the regional and 
global pressures. It is the level where the developmental model and the governing regime 
could be addressed in relatively greater autonomy. This does not mean that structural 
pressures do not exist on this level and that practically any alternative is available. Clearly, 
there probably would be unbearable foreign pressures for serious violations of democratic 
rule, or wide scale nationalization of the economy. The question, therefore, is not whether 
there is an alternative to democracy and free market, but rather how to deepen the 
democratic rule in order to assure greater participation in the decision making process, and 
how to address the consequences of the economic transition in terms of an efficient 
struggle against corruption, the reconstruction of social safety nets, and a better 
redistribution of wealth. The current political and societal fragmentation in Armenia with 
over fifty political parties and three thousands or so Non-Governmental Organizations is 
also the consequence of an economic transition that led to an extreme concentration of the 
wealth within the hands of a minority that has a major impact on the decision making 
process. The Constitutional reform that should lead to major political decentralization and 
a boost to the role of the legislative power is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, the 
issues of corruption, poverty, deteriorated social services, lack of protection for the most 
marginalized sectors… need to be addressed radically, much more than what the current 
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